IN “What Judges Say About Speech Freedom, Sedition,” I referred to the case of PP v Ooi Kee Saik (1979), where High Court Judge Ajaib Singh (as he then was) stated that to “establish its case against the accused, the prosecution is not obliged to prove that anything said in his speech was true or false, or that it caused any disturbance or a breach of the peace.” 

I also referred to the case of Public Prosecutor v Param Cumaraswamy (1986), where High Court Judge N H Chan (as he then was) said, “If the words complained of are themselves ‘expressive of a seditious intention’ as defined in the [Act], they are ‘seditious words’. It is not necessary to produce any extrinsic evidence of intention, outside the words themselves, before seditious intention can exist. If the words are seditious by reason of their expression of a seditious intention as defined in the [Sedition Act], the seditious intention appears without any extrinsic evidence.”